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COVID-19 & THE ILLINOIS HEALTH CARE
RIGHT OF CONSCIENCE ACT:
A LEGAL ANALYSIS
Matthew Moustis+
During the COVID-19 pandemic, many people who refused to be
vaccinated because of their religious or moral beliefs tried to use the
Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act to block their employers'
vaccination requirements. In response, some elected officials argued
that the Act was being misinterpreted. They believed it was intended
only to protect health care providers who refused to provide certain
services to patients, not to allow people to avoid measures taken to
ensure public health during a pandemic. Their interpretations were
incorrect. The Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act was
properly construed as a right to refuse COVID-19 vaccines on
religious or moral grounds. And it was properly construed as applying
to anyone, not solely to health care providers. Contrary
interpretations are inconsistent with the public policy, the statutory
language, and the interpretive caselaw. Furthermore, the latest
amendment was not a legislative clarification but a substantive change
to the law.
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INTRODUCTION

The tragic loss of life,1 seemingly never-ending sickness, and
severe social disruption2 brought about by COVID-19 have created “a
world that feels and is very different from just a few years ago.”3 As
Justice Gorsuch put it, “No one doubts that the COVID-19 pandemic
has posed challenges for every American.”4 Crafting and
implementing public policy to effectively navigate the pandemic has
been incredibly difficult, resulting in increased political polarization in
the United States.5 And perhaps no contemporary policy has amplified
the political divide more than vaccine mandates.6 “Such mandates
have . . . led to collisions between the interests of public health,

+
J.D. Candidate, Northern Illinois University College of Law, Class of
2023. Thank you to everyone who supported and encouraged me throughout the writing
process: Professor Meredith Geller and Professor Marc Falkoff; my wonderful girlfriend,
Samantha Janis; and all my colleagues on the Review. Thank you to my father, James Moustis,
who continues to be my greatest teacher. Thank you to the entire College of Law faculty for
teaching me how to think like a lawyer.
1
See
COVID
Data
Tracker,
https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#trends_totaldeaths (providing a live count of COVID-19 related deaths).
2 John Carroll, The Social Disruption of COVID-19, LA TROBE UNIV. (Mar. 23,
2020),
https://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2020/opinion/the-social-disruption-ofcovid-19 [https://perma.cc/UM86-XMPZ].
3 E-mail from Therese Clarke-Arado, Dir., N. Ill. Univ. L. Libr., to author (Jan. 07,
2022, 12:26 PM CST) (on file with author).
4 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., 142 S. Ct. 661, 667 (2022) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring).

Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: Will the Supreme Court Back Sensible Workplace
Vaccine Mandates?, L. A. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/202201-03/supreme-court-covid-mandates [https://perma.cc/NR4W-JLV5].
5

6 See Margaret Talev, Axios-Ipsos Poll: 60% of Voters Back Biden Vaccine
Mandates, AXIOS (Sept. 14, 2021), https://www.axios.com/axios-ipsos-poll-covid-vaccinemandates-biden-c0b7af63-6de0-4ec2-82bf-fb85e3e021ea.html
[https://perma.cc/PGE7NZG6].
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personal liberty, and public policy”7 while simultaneously flooding
our legal system with complex and unique issues.8
Such issues arose in Illinois after Governor J.B. Pritzker ordered
health care workers,9 school personnel,10 higher education personnel,11
and employees of state-owned or state-operated congregate facilities12
to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Employers followed by
implementing vaccine requirements of their own and threatening to
remove unvaccinated employees from the workplace. But many
workers refused to comply with the mandates, “citing a range of
religious, moral, political, and conscience objections” to the
vaccines.13 Some of these objections were based on notions of natural
immunity;14 concerns about the expedited nature of the available
vaccines15 and unidentified side effects;16 a general distrust of the

Does 1-14 v. NorthShore Univ. HealthSystem, No. 21-cv-05683, 2021
WL 5578790, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2021).
7

8 See Jill Turner Lever & David I. Rosen, Religious Exemptions from Mandated
COVID-19 Vaccines: Must Employers Consider Those Employee Requests?, NAT’L L. REV.
(Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/religious-exemptions-mandatedcovid-19-vaccines-must-employers-consider-those [https://perma.cc/48GT-V27U].
9
Ill.
Exec.
Order
No.
87
§
2
(Aug.
26,
2021),
https://www.illinois.gov/government/executive-orders/executive-order.executive-ordernumber-20.2021.html [https://perma.cc/64BP-6H4W].
10

Id. § 3.

11

Id. § 4.

12

Id. § 5.

Adam R. Young, Melissa A. Ortega & Craig B. Simonson, A Swing and a Miss:
Right to Conscience Objections to COVID-19 Vaccinations to Endure Until June 2022,
SEYFARTH (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.seyfarth.com/news-insights/swing-and-a-miss-rightto-conscience-objections-to-covid-19-vaccinations-to-endure-until-june-2022.html
[https://perma.cc/RH8Q-77AZ].
13

14 Emma Bloomfield, 3 Common COVID Vaccination Objections, UNLV (Aug. 17,
2021),
https://www.unlv.edu/news/article/3-common-covid-vaccination-objections
[https://perma.cc/TG2F-GGPA].

Id. See also This is How the COVID-19 Vaccine was Expedited, ST. JOSEPH
HEALTH (Apr. 14, 2021), https://stjoseph.stlukeshealth.org/healthy-resources/blogs/this-ishow-the-covid-19-vaccine-was-expedited [https://perma.cc/U9N8-77AP].
15

16

Bloomfield, supra note 14.
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government;17 concurrent, chronic health issues; or the inherent lack
of informed consent in vaccine mandates.18 In addition, people of
various religious backgrounds often objected because of “what they
view as an impermissible connection between the vaccines and the cell
lines of aborted fetuses.”19
Some employers nonetheless refused to provide religious
exemptions to their vaccine policies, forcing employees of faith to
choose between their conscience and their careers. “Very few
scenarios paint a bleaker picture than giving up your livelihood in
order to follow your religious beliefs.”20 Seemingly overnight, the
“essential workers” who labored tirelessly to protect others and
provide necessary services during the early stages of the pandemic
became easily dispensable: “They can elect to comply with the policy,
or they can seek other employment.”21
Searching for a form of redress, some people sued their
employers under the Illinois Health Care Right of Conscience Act

Henry Enten, How Long-Standing Mistrust of Government is Hurting Our
Vaccination
Efforts,
CNN
(July
10,
2021,
9:24
AM
EST),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/10/politics/vaccinations-government-mistrustanalysis/index.html [https://perma.cc/9ENN-2RNH].
17

18 See generally Ethics: Informed Consent, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.amaassn.org/delivering-care/ethics/informed-consent
(last
visited
Jan.
16,
2022)
[https://perma.cc/TYH4-S8Z2].

Does 1-3 v. Mills, 595 U.S. ___, ___, 142 S. Ct. 17, 19 (2021) (Gorsuch, J.
dissenting) (“More specifically, they allege that the Johnson & Johnson vaccine required the
use of abortion-related materials in its production, and that Moderna and Pfizer relied on
aborted fetal cell lines to develop their vaccines.”). See also Memorandum of Law in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, at 1, Does 1-14 v.
NorthShore Univ. HealthSystem, No. 21-cv-05683 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (“Plaintiffs are healthcare
professionals, all of whom have sincerely held religious beliefs against the COVID-19
vaccines because they were either developed from, or tested with, aborted fetal cell lines.”).
19

20 See Air Force Officer v. Austin, No. 5:22-cv-00009, 2022 WL 468799 at *23
(M.D. Ga. Feb 15, 2022).

Defendant City of Chicago’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Emergency Petition for A
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 2, Troogstad v. City of Chi., 576
F. Supp. 3d 578 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (No. 21-cv-05600), 2021 WL 9219789.
21
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(“Conscience Act” or “Act”).22 The Act provides, in part, that “It shall
be unlawful for any person, public or private institution . . . to
discriminate against any person in any manner . . . because of such
person’s conscientious refusal to receive, obtain, accept . . . any
particular form of health care services contrary to his or her
conscience.”23 One of the broadest conscience clauses in the country,
the Act protects the individual right to refuse health care services that
conflict with one’s religious or moral beliefs. Those services
specifically include “medication” and “other treatment . . . intended
for the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of persons,”24 so
vaccines were commonly thought to fall within the Act’s scope.
But in response to the rise in lawsuits challenging vaccine
mandates, some elected officials argued that the Conscience Act was
being misinterpreted. “The Healthcare Right of Conscience Act is
being misinterpreted . . . and used in court cases to try to allow people
who just don’t want to get vaccinated, or anti-vaxxers . . . to avoid the
rules,” Governor Pritzker stated.25 His administration advocated for a
legislative clarification to prevent the Act from being “misinterpreted
by fringe elements.”26 Other Democrats echoed these thoughts. “The
Act is being intentionally distorted by those who favor misinformation
over fact, and those who are using this Act to justify their desire to
thumb their noses at the mitigation efforts imposed by employers to
stop the spread of COVID-19, a deadly virus,”27 said Representative
22 Peter Hancock, Pritzker Signs Health Care Right of Conscience Change, CAP.
NEWS ILL. (Nov. 09, 2021), https://www.capitolnewsillinois.com/NEWS/pritzker-signshealth-care-right-of-conscience-change [https://perma.cc/4MW8-TMHT].
23

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2022).

24

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(a) (2022).

Illinois in Focus, Episode 162: Democrats Carve COVID out of Right of
Conscience Act, THE CTR. SQUARE ILL., at 3:12-3:28 (Oct. 29, 2021) (accessed using Apple
Podcasts).
25

26 Dylan Sharkey, Pritzker Wants to End Health Conscience Law’s Use to Avoid
COVID-19 Vax, ILL. POL’Y (Oct. 16, 2021), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/pritzker-wants-toend-health-conscience-laws-use-to-avoid-covid-19-vax/ [https://perma.cc/CUU9-HK8J].
27 WCIA News, Illinois House Alters Health Care Right of Conscience Act,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2021), https://youtu.be/8tN-Y8Yzj00 [https://perma.cc/4DD3-WDPY].
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Robyn Gabel. Similarly, a spokesperson for Illinois Attorney General
Kwame Raoul stated that those trying to use the Act to block their
employers’ vaccine requirements were relying on misinterpretations of
the law and urged the legislature to “clarify its intent when passing the
law” to “help ensure that it is not misinterpreted or misapplied in ways
the [l]egislature did not intend.”28
These elected officials took the position that the Conscience Act
was intended only to protect health care providers who refused to
provide certain services to patients, and that the legislature never
intended it to allow people to disregard measures taken to protect the
public during a pandemic.29 But others felt that those interpretations
were disingenuous and that the Act explicitly protected those who
refused vaccines on moral or religious grounds. As they saw it, losing
your career because of a vaccine mandate was the exact type of harm
the Act was intended to prevent.
Despite strong public opposition, the Illinois legislature eventually
resolved the dispute by amending the Act.30 The amendment added
Section 13.5, which provides that it is not a violation of the Act for
“any person or public official, or for any public or private . . .
employer, to take any measures or impose any requirements, including
. . . provision of services by a physician or health care personnel,
intended to prevent contraction or transmission of COVID-19.”31 The
legislature labeled this provision “a declaration of existing law” that
should not be “construed as a new enactment,”32 and instructed the

28

See Hancock, supra note 22.

See, e.g., Jerry Nowicki, House Approves Changes to Health Care Right of Conscience
Act, ILLINOIS NEWS ROOM, Oct. 28, 2021, https://illinoisnewsroom.org/house-approveschanges-to-health-care-right-of-conscience-act/ [https://perma.cc/2E39-YNWX].
30 See id. (“More than 50,000 witness slips were filed against it on the Illinois
General Assembly website.”).
29

31

745 ILL. COMP STAT. 70/13.5 (2022).

32

Id.
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courts to apply it retroactively “to all actions commenced or pending
on or after” June 1, 2022.33
This Comment argues that the Health Care Right of Conscience
Act was properly construed as a right to refuse COVID-19 vaccines on
religious or moral grounds, and is applicable to anyone, not solely to
health care providers. Contrary interpretations are inconsistent with
the public policy, the statutory language, and the interpretive caselaw.
Furthermore, the latest amendment was not a legislative clarification
but a substantive change to the law. Section II of this Comment
provides a background of conscience clauses.34 Section III examines
the Conscience Act.35 Part A analyzes the text and legislative history;36
Part B discusses how courts have interpreted the Act;37 Part C applies
principles of statutory interpretation to decipher the Act’s proper
application to COVID-19 vaccine refusals.38 Section IV invokes the
Doctrine of Clarifications39 and analyzes the latest amendment under
the legal standard used by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to
determine whether a statutory amendment constitutes a clarification
or, alternatively, a substantive change to the law.40

II.

BACKGROUND

To understand the scope and function of the Conscience Act, some
background on other conscience clauses is necessary. A “conscience
clause”41 is a law that protects the individual right to refuse to partake
33

Id.

34

See infra text accompanying notes 41-66.

35

See infra text accompanying notes 67-160; 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70 (2022).

36

See infra text accompanying notes 67-98.

37

See infra text accompanying notes 99-148.

38

See infra text accompanying notes 149-60.

See infra text accompanying notes 161-84. See generally Pat McDonell, Note,
The Doctrine of Clarifications, 119 MICH. L. REV. 797 (2021).
39

40

See Middleton v. Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 664 (7th Cir. 2009).

Also known as a refusal law. See Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516,
2534 (2015).
41
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in certain health care services that conflict with that person’s religious
or moral beliefs. Such laws emerged after the Supreme Court’s 1973
decisions in Roe v. Wade42 and Doe v. Bolton.43 Before these cases,
“46 of 50 states prohibited all or almost all abortions.”44 Then Roe
established a constitutional right to have an abortion and struck down
virtually every state’s criminal abortion statute.45 Post Roe, abortions
became “more accessible to women throughout the country,”46 causing
many health care providers to fear that they may be required to perform
or assist with the procedure despite their religious and moral beliefs.47
Such was the case in Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital,48 where a
Catholic hospital was required “to allow its facilities to be used for
sterilization, specifically, a tubal litigation procedure.”49 Lawmakers
responded to this case by enacting conscience clauses in order to
“address the moral dilemma in which health care providers might find
themselves if called upon to provide services that are contrary to their
consciences.”50 Thus, conscience clauses typically apply only to health
care providers, allowing them “to refuse to perform certain services
42 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s
Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
43

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

44 Erwin Chemerinsky, Ruling in Abortion Cases Will Greatly Affect Women’s Lives
but
Won’t
End
Controversy,
A.B.A.
J.
(Nov.
30,
2021),
https://www.abajournal.com/columns/article/chemerinsky-ruling-in-abortion-cases-willgreatly-affect-womens-lives-but-wont-end-controversy [https://perma.cc/84ZA-K8Z8].

John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
L.J. 920 (1973).
45

46
Roe v. Wade: Its History and Impact, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/3013/9611/5870/Abortion_Roe_History.pdf (last
updated Jan. 2014) https://perma.cc/H3SN-243S.

See Mark Hinds, Note, Balancing Medical Conscious Clauses and LifeThreatening Scenarios--It Is Time for Congress to Create Emergency Exceptions to The
Church Amendment, 15 CHARLESTON L. REV. 509, 513 (2021).
47

48 Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948, 950 n.1 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d,
523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
49

City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Azar, 411 F. Supp. 3d 1001, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2019).

50

See id. See also Rojas v. Martell, 2020 IL App (2d) 190215, 161 N.E.3d 336.
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that they oppose on religious and moral grounds without fear of
retribution.”51 Such services usually include abortions, sterilizations,
and dispensing contraceptives.52

A. THE CHURCH AMENDMENT
The first federal conscience clause was the Church Amendment.53
This law prohibited individuals and entities receiving federal grants
from being forced to perform or assist with abortions or sterilizations
despite their religious or moral beliefs.54 The law also prohibited such
entities from being required to host abortions or sterilizations in their
facilities55 and prohibited them from discriminating against employees
who refused to partake in those services.56 The statutory language
applied only to individuals and entities involved in providing abortions
or sterilization procedures.

B. DOE V. BOLTON
Another conscience clause was at issue in the Supreme Court case
Doe v. Bolton.57 Here, the Court struck down several provisions of a
Georgia statute that regulated abortions.58 But the Court upheld the
statute’s conscience clause provision, which prevented hospitals from
being required to admit abortion patients, forcing their employees to
perform abortions, and being held liable for refusing to admit abortion
patients.59 Writing for the Court in Doe, Justice Blackmun explained
that this clause gave hospitals “the right not to admit an abortion
51 Tom C.W. Lin, Treating an Unhealthy Conscience: A Prescription for Medical
Conscience Clauses, 31 VT. L. REV. 105 (2006).
52

Id. at 107.

53

42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2021).

54

Id. § 300a-7(b).

55

Id. § 300a-7(b)(2)(A).

56

Id. § 300a-7(c)(1)(A)-(B).

57

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).

Richard Wasserman, Implications of The Abortion Decisions: Post Roe and Doe
Litigation and Legislation, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 239-40 (1974).
58

59

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 205 app. A §(e).
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patient” and gave health care providers “the right, on moral or religious
grounds, not to participate in the procedure.”60 Again, the statutory
language applied only to individuals and entities involved in providing
abortions.

C. THE ILLINOIS ABORTION ACT OF 1975
In response to Roe and Doe, the Illinois legislature enacted the
Abortion Act of 1975.61 The law regulated abortions in accordance
with the framework set forth in Roe.62 It also contained a conscience
clause: “No physician, hospital, . . . nor employee thereof, shall be
required against his or its conscience declared in writing to perform,
permit or participate in any abortion . . . .”63 Under this clause,
religious and moral objections to performing abortions could not form
the basis for “any civil, criminal, administrative or disciplinary action,
proceeding, penalty, or punishment” against the health care provider.64
Like the conscience clauses discussed above, this provision only
protected individuals and entities involved in providing abortions.65 Its
language directly reflected this purpose. Important to our discussion,
this law was enacted before–and remained in effect when–the
Conscience Act was passed.66 This law’s existence is therefore
evidence that the legislature did not intend the Conscience Act to apply
only to health care providers, because providers were already protected
under the Abortion Act.

60

Doe, 410 U.S. at 184.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/1 (2018) (repealed by P.A. 101-13) (“It is the intention
of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably regulate abortion in conformance
with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court of January 22, 1973.”).
61

62 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973), overruled by Dobbs v. Jackson
Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
63

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/13 (repealed by P.A. 101-13).

64

Id.

65

See sources cited supra notes 54-61.

66

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 510/13 (repealed by P.A. 101-13).
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THE ILLINOIS HEALTH CARE RIGHT OF
CONSCIENCE ACT
A. TEXT & LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

First, a quick look at the legislative history. A single, brief
discussion that took place during the legislative debate before the Act
was passed supports the argument that it was only intended to protect
health care providers. Senator Phillip Rock stated that the Conscience
Act would “allow hospitals and medical personnel the right not to
participate in medical procedures with which they . . . do not agree in
conscience.”67 He then referenced a law passed two sessions prior that
created a right of conscience for hospitals and medical personnel
concerning abortion (seemingly a reference to the Abortion Act,
discussed above).68 “The Conscience Act,” he explained, “frankly, is
a little broader. It includes other medical procedures such as
sterilization or advice on family planning.”69
He was then asked, “How about the reverse situation where there
is a Christian Science participant . . . can they have a right to refuse
treatment . . . if a patient or the parent of a patient does not want any
services?”70 “No,” he responded, “they have that right currently, and
this Act doesn’t change that.”71 But as it happens, the language enacted
by the legislature was much broader than Senator Rock described. In
fact, his statements directly conflicted with the Act’s language.72

67

S. Transcripts, 80th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 377 (Ill. June 22, 1977).

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 377-78.

71

Id. at 378.

72 See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020) (“When the express
terms of a statute give us one answer and extra textual considerations suggest another, it’s no
contest. Only the written word is law, and all persons are entitled to its benefit.”).
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Unlike the conscience clauses discussed above, the Conscience Act
was not limited to protecting health care providers.
Take the original preamble, for example: “An Act concerning the
right of medical personnel, medical facilities, and persons receiving
medical care to be free to act in accord with their conscience and to be
free from any form of discrimination due to acts in accord with their
conscience.”73
Section 2 describes the policy underlying the Act: “to respect and
protect the right of all persons who refuse to obtain, receive or accept
. . . the delivery of . . . health care services and medical care”74 and to
“prohibit all forms of discrimination, disqualification, coercion,
disability or imposition of liability upon such persons or entities by
reason of their refusing to act contrary to their conscience.”75
Under the Act, the term “conscience” is defined as “a sincerely
held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and relation to God,
or which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by God among adherents to religious
faiths.”76
The term “health care” means “any phase of patient care,
including . . . testing . . . medication . . . or other treatment rendered by
a physician . . . nurses, paraprofessionals or medical facility, intended
for the physical emotional, and mental well-being of persons.”77
The Act also defines the terms “physician,” “health care
personnel,” and “health care facility” and frequently uses those terms
to limit the scope of certain provisions.78

73

Right of Conscience Act, Pub. Act 80-616, 1977 Ill. Laws 1912 (emphasis added).

74

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2022).

75

Id.

76

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(e) (2022).

77

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3(a) (2022).

78

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/3 (2022).
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The substantive anti-discrimination provisions start at Section
4. Here, we find another distinct clause applicable only to physicians
and health care personnel.79 Section 4 provides that “No physician or
health care personnel shall be civilly or criminally liable . . . by reason
of his or her refusal to perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend,
refer or participate in any way in any particular form of health care
service which is contrary to the conscience of such physician or health
care personnel.”80 Again, the language of this provision applies only
to individuals involved in providing health care services. But now, in
contrast to the Abortion Act,81 the covered services were expanded.
In contrast to Section 4, the anti-discrimination provision
found in Section 5 is not limited to protecting health care providers; it
applies to everyone. It provides that
It shall be unlawful for any person, public or
private institution, or public official to
discriminate against any person in any
manner . . . because of such person’s
conscientious refusal to receive, obtain, accept,
perform, assist, counsel, suggest, recommend,
refer or participate in any way in any particular
form of health care service contrary to his or her
conscience.82
This provision indirectly defines discrimination by providing a nonexhaustive list of “activities for which discrimination is prohibited.”83
These include “licensing, hiring, promotion, transfer, . . . or any other
privileges. . . .”84

79

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/4 (2022).

80

Id.

81

See supra text accompanying notes 61-64.

82

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2022) (emphasis added).

83

Glass v. Dep’t of Corr., 2022 IL App (4th) 220270, ¶ 39.

84

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2022).
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Section 7 is similarly broad. It provides that “It shall be
unlawful for any public or private employer . . . to deny admission
because of, to place any reference in its application form concerning,
to orally question about, to impose any burdens in terms and conditions
of employment on, or to otherwise discriminate against, any applicant”
because of their “refusal to receive, obtain, accept, perform, counsel,
suggest, recommend, refer, assist, or participate in any way in any
forms of health care services contrary to his or her conscience.”85
Section 12 provides for the damages available under the Act. It
provides that “Any person . . . injured . . . by reason of any action
prohibited by this Act . . . shall recover threefold the actual damages,
including pain and suffering,” as well as reasonable attorney’s fees.86
The legislature first amended the Act in 1997.87 Following a
national trend, it was expanded to protect religious entities that pay for
health care services.88 The terminology used in the Act also changed:
references to “medical care” were replaced with “health care.”89 And
the public policy statement was prefaced by adding the following
language: “The General Assembly finds and declares that people and
organizations hold different beliefs about whether certain health care
services are morally acceptable.”90 Sound familiar?
It was amended again in 2017.91 This time around the Act was
changed to ensure that patients would receive “timely, medically
accurate information about the range of legal treatment options
available”92 when they were denied access to treatment. Additional
85

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/7 (2022).

86

745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/12 (2022) (emphasis added).

87

Act of Jan. 1, 1998, Pub. Act 90-246, 1997 Ill. Laws 2917.

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.
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Act of Jan. 1, 2017, Pub. Act 99-690, 2016 Ill. Laws 2844.

92

S. Deb., 99th Gen. Assemb., 31st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015).
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requirements were placed on providers who refused to provide
services: they now had to inform the patient of their condition,
prognosis, legal treatment options, and the risks and benefits
associated with those options; refer or transfer the patient upon
request; tell the patient about other providers who might perform those
services; and deliver to those providers copies of the patient’s medical
records.93 In order for providers to avail themselves of the Act’s
protections, they had to abide by all of these protocols.94
Finally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Act was amended
once more.95 This amendment added Section 13.5, which provides
that:
It is not a violation of this Act for any person or
public official, or for any public or private
association, agency, corporation, entity,
institution, or employer to take any measures or
impose any requirements, including . . . any
measures or requirements that involve the
provision of services by a physician or health
care personnel, intended to prevent contraction
or transmission of COVID-19.96
It further provides that “It is not a violation of this Act to enforce such
measures or requirements,” clearing the path for employers to rid
unvaccinated employees from the workplace without facing liability
under the Conscience Act.97 The legislature labeled this provision a
legislative clarification rather than acknowledging that it substantively
changed law.98

93

See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/6.1 (2022).
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See id.
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See 745 ILL. COM. STAT. 70/13.5 (2022).
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See id.
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Id.
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B. INTERPRETIVE CASELAW
Caselaw interpreting the Conscience Act was relatively limited
before it was used to challenge COVID-19 vaccine requirements.99 So
understanding how the courts had interpreted the Act did not require a
searching inquiry. Still, no court ever ruled on the Act’s applicability
to vaccine mandates. As such, while not determinative on the issue of
vaccine refusals, the courts’ analysis in the following cases provide
insight as to the proper interpretation of the Act.
In Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court held that the
Conscience Act’s anti-discrimination provisions apply to all
individuals, not solely to health care providers.100 The plaintiff in this
case was a pharmacist working for Wal-Mart.101 An administrative
regulation required pharmacists to dispense contraceptives,102 but the
plaintiff refused because his religion forbade him “from directly or
indirectly participating in causing the death of an innocent human
life.”103 Wal-Mart then placed him on unpaid leave,104 so the plaintiff
sued Wal-Mart for violating the Conscience Act.105 As a defense, WalMart appealed to the Act’s legislative history and argued that its
protections should apply only to health care personnel; a pharmacist,
they argued, did not fit that description.106 The court declined to resort
to the legislative history because the Act was unambiguous.107 It then
rejected Wal-Mart’s limited interpretation, holding that “the anti-

99

There were less than 20 published opinions citing the Act.

Vandersand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1057 (C.D. Ill.
2007).
100

101

Id. at 1053.
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Id. at 1053-55.

103

Id. at 1054-55.

104

Id. at 1055.
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Vandersand, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
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Id. at 1057.

107

Id. at 1057.
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discrimination provisions are not limited to health care personnel” but
rather “prohibit[] discrimination against any person.”108
Morr-Fitz. Inc v. Quinn was much of the same.109 Here, the
plaintiffs sued state officials to enjoin the enforcement of an
administrative rule requiring pharmacies to “dispense or aid in the
dispensing of emergency contraception.”110 Asserting religious
objections, the plaintiffs refused to comply and argued that the rule
violated the Conscience Act.111 The court explained that “the statutory
language is clear,” and that Section 5 prohibits discrimination in
licensing against anyone.112 The court also explained that the Act’s
purpose was to bolster the individual right to exercise religion “by
offering protections to those who seek not to act in the healthcare
setting due to religious convictions.”113 The court found that the
plaintiff's refusal to dispense contraceptives was covered by the Act,
so it blocked the enforcement of the administrative rule against
them.114
In Cohen v. Smith, the court allowed a patient to state a claim
against a hospital and a nurse under the Conscience Act.115 In that case,
the plaintiff was at the hospital preparing to deliver her baby when she
was informed that she would need to undergo a C-Section.116 Before
the procedure began, the plaintiff and her husband told their doctor and
the hospital staff that their “religious beliefs prohibited Cohen from

108

Id. at 1057 (internal quotations omitted).

109

See Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 2012 IL App (4th) 110398, 976 N.E.2d 1160.

110

Id. ¶ 1, 976 N.E.2d at 1163.
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Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 976 N.E.2d at 1163.
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Id. ¶ 61, 976 N.E.2d at 1172.
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See id. ¶ 54, 976 N.E.2d at 1171.
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Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Quinn, 2012 IL App (4th) 110398, ¶ 84, 976 N.E.2d 1160,
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Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 335-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995).
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Id. at 331.
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being seen unclothed by a male.”117 Despite being assured that their
beliefs would be honored, a “male nurse . . . allegedly observed and
touched [the plaintiff’s] naked body” during the procedure.118 The
plaintiff and her husband sued the hospital and the nurse separately for
violating the Conscience Act. The trial court originally dismissed their
claims,119 but the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff
had stated a claim under the Act.120 This case demonstrates that
patients also have a right to refuse treatment under the Conscience Act;
its protections are not limited to health care providers.
In Rojas v. Martell, the court rejected the argument that the
term “discriminate,” in Section 5 of the Conscience Act, was
ambiguous.121 The plaintiff here was a nurse working for a county
health department.122 When the department began requiring all of its
nurses to provide family planning and women’s health services, the
plaintiff refused because her Catholic faith prevented her from
providing contraceptives, birth-control, and from referring patients for
abortions.123 The department declined to provide her a religious
accommodation, so she resigned and sued under the Conscience
Act.124 As part of its defense, the department argued that the term
“discriminate” as used in Section 5 was ambiguous.125 The court
rejected this argument, noting that the ordinary meaning of the word is
set forth in its dictionary definition.126
But more recently, the court in Glass v. Department of
Corrections held that the term “discriminate” in Section 5 was
117

Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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See Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. 1995).
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Rojas v. Martell, 2020 IL App (2d) 190215, ¶ 32, 161 N.E.3d 336, 345-46.
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Id. ¶ 1, 161 N.E.3d at 339.
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Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 161 N.E.3d at 339-40.
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Id. ¶¶ 7-11, 161 N.E.3d at 340-41.
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Id. ¶ 28, 161 N.E.3d at 344.
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Rojas v. Martell, 2020 IL App (2d) 190215, ¶ 32, 161 N.E.3d 336, 345-46.
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ambiguous in the context of a vaccinate-or-test policy.127 In Glass,
public employees sued their employers and Governor Pritzker to
prevent them from requiring the employees to either be vaccinated for
COVID-19 or submit to weekly testing.128 The circuit court relied on
the latest amendment to the Act129 and denied the plaintiffs’ relief.130
On appeal, the district court attempted to determine whether the term
“discriminate” in Section 5 was sufficiently obscure or ambiguous to
justify the circuit court’s reliance on the latest amendment as an
interpretive guide to statutory language.131 The district court first
declined to adopt the Rojas’ analysis, explaining that a dictionary
definition alone is insufficient to render a word unambiguous.132 “By
that logic,” the court reasoned, “a term in a statute would be ambiguous
only if the term were a non-word.”133
The district court instead conducted its own analysis,
beginning with the dictionary definition of “discriminate”: to “fail[] to
treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found
between those favored and those not favored . . . [or] to make a
difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in
disregard of individual merit.”134 The district court reasoned that, so
long as the employers fired all employees who refused to vaccinate or
test, for reasons of conscious or otherwise, the employer could not be
said to have “discriminated” against anyone within the traditional
sense of the term.135
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Glass v. Dep’t of Corr., 2022 IL App (4th) 220270, ¶ 24.
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Id. ¶ 1.

See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/5 (2022) (stating that it is not a violation of the act
for any employer to take measures calculated to prevent the spread of COVID-19).
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Id. ¶ 17.
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Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotations and edits omitted).

135

Glass v. Dep’t of Corr., 2022 IL App (4th) 220270, ¶ 21.
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But the majority acknowledged that ascribing this meaning of
“discriminate” conflicts with the plain language of the Act.136 It also
conflicts with underlying public policy137 because employees “who
refused on the grounds of conscience would incur a penalty for his or
her exercise of conscience.”138 Thus, the majority found that the
enacting legislature intended to use the term “discriminate in an
unconventional sense, as meaning taking an unfavorable action against
someone who, for reasons of conscience, refuse[s] to submit to or
participate in any form of health care.”139 For the court, this
unconventional use was sufficient to find the term “discriminate”
ambiguous and affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief.140
The dissent however believed that Rojas was decided
correctly141 and the term “discriminate” was unambiguous.142 Section
5 makes it unlawful to discriminate “in any manner” against an
individual who refuses health care services that conflict with their
religious or moral beliefs.143 The dissent explained that by using the
“in any manner” language, the legislature intended a broad meaning of
the term “discriminate” and “made clear [that] a court evaluating
claims of discrimination should not be concerned with identifying
precisely how that discrimination occurred.”144 Furthermore, because
the public policy is to “prohibit all forms of discrimination,”145 and the
text sets forth numerous “examples of activities for which
discrimination is prohibited,”146 the legislature intended that “the

136

Id. ¶ 22.
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See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2 (2022).
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protections of the Conscience Act be read as broadly as possible.”147
And given the “importance of the civil rights at issue,” the majority’s
“parsing of a single word in the statute is insufficient.”148

C. APPLICATION TO COVID-19 VACCINE REFUSALS
The primary goal of statutory construction is to interpret and give
effect to the legislature’s intent.149 The best evidence of legislative
intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning.150 When the statute is unambiguous, courts “may
not depart from the statute’s terms.”151 And those terms aren’t to be
considered in isolation; they must be read in light of other provisions
of the statute to determine their meaning, as to ensure that no term is
rendered superfluous or meaningless.152
First, the Conscience Act was not intended to apply only to
health care providers. The original preamble explained that the Act
concerned “persons receiving medical care” and was intended to allow
them “to be free to act in accord with their conscience.”153 The public
policy is to protect the rights of “all persons who refuse to obtain,
receive or accept . . . the delivery of . . . health care services and
medical care.”154 To be sure, a few of the Act’s provisions–Sections 4,
6, and 6.1– apply only to “physicians” and “health care personnel.”155
But Sections 5 and 7 are much broader; they prohibit discrimination
against “any person” and “any applicant,” respectively.156 And Section
12 allows “any person . . . injured” in violation of the Act to recover
147
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damages.157 Thus, Sections 5, 7, and 12 function to protect the
individual right to refuse health care services that conflict with one’s
religious and moral beliefs. Contrary interpretations are inconsistent
with the statutory language and would render the phrases “any person”
and “any applicant” used in Sections 5, 7, and 12 meaningless, and
Sections 5 and 7 would be entirely superfluous.
Second, the plain meaning of the term “health care service”
encompasses COVID-19 vaccines. Section 5 prohibits discrimination
against any person who refuses to participate in any health care service
contrary to his religious or moral beliefs.158 Those services include
“medication” and “other care or treatment rendered by a
physician . . . intended for the physical . . . well-being of persons.”159
COVID-19 vaccines are a form of medication intended to protect
people’s physical well-being from the harmful effects of a COVID-19
infection. And perhaps no form of health care service is more in-line
with the public policy because “people and organizations” certainly
“hold different beliefs about whether” COVID-19 vaccines “are
morally acceptable.”160 Thus, the Act was properly construed as
protecting the rights of conscience of individuals who refuse COVID19 vaccines on religious or moral grounds.

SECTION 13.5: A SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE TO THE
LAW

IV.

The latest amendment “clarifies” that it is “not a violation of
the Conscience Act for any employer to take measures calculated to
prevent the spread of COVID-19.”161 This implicates the Doctrine of
Clarifications.162 “When a legislative body or agency amends a prior
enactment, the amendment serves one of two purposes. The
157
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amendment either changes the substantive content of the law, or
amends the previous language without actually changing the law’s
meaning.”163 This Comment refers to the former as a substantive
change and the latter as a legislative clarification.164 True clarifications
simply restate what the law has always been.165 In so doing, the law is,
in essence, “reworded to better reflect what it already meant.”166 As
such, no new legal consequences result from the change.167 “By
contrast, a substantive change establishes, creates, or defines
rights,”168 resulting in new legal consequences.169
The distinction between a clarification and a substantive
change is most significant when a court considers whether to apply an
amendment retroactively.170 As restatements of the law, clarifications
do not technically apply retroactively because the law has not
changed.171 But clarifications can seem retroactive in the sense that
they impact the resolution of pending cases.172 But because
clarifications “do not change the prior state of the law, there is no
injustice in allowing them to apply retroactively,”173 whereas
substantive changes to the law typically only apply prospectively. This
presumption against retroactivity “is founded upon the premise that
fundamental fairness requires that citizens be given notice of a statute
so they may conform their behavior to new or revised
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requirements.”174 However, this presumption can be overcome, and
legislatures can apply civil statutes retroactively if they expressly
declare an intention to do so. This assures the courts “that the enacting
body itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of
retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to
pay for the countervailing benefits.”175
In Middleton v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals articulated the standard it uses to determine whether a
statutory amendment constitutes a legislative clarification, or a
substantive change: (1) whether the enacting body declared that it was
clarifying a prior enactment; (2) whether a conflict or ambiguity
existed prior to the amendment; and (3) whether the amendment is
consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment and
its legislative history.176
Let us apply this standard to the Conscience Act. First, the
legislature labeled Section 13.5 as a “declaration of existing law.”177
Stated differently, a legislative clarification. But the legislature went
one step further to ensure that this provision would apply retroactively
by providing that “[t]his Section shall apply to all actions commenced
or pending on or after the effective date.”178 If this amendment were
truly a clarification of existing law, it would automatically apply back
to the date of the original enactment and there would be no need to
include a statement of retroactivity. This casts a shadow of doubt on
the legislature’s description; it appears that the legislature instructed
the courts to apply the law retroactively even if they determined that
the amendment substantively changed the law.
Second, prior to the amendment, no court had ever determined
that the Act was ambiguous. And there were not any conflicting
174 2 NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 41:2 (7th ed. 2022).
175

McDonell, supra note 39, at 806.
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interpretations among the courts. In Vandersand, the court explained
that “[t]he language is clear. Health Care includes any phase of patient
care, and specifically includes medication. The Court has no need to
resort to legislative history to understand the plain meaning of this
definition. The statute prohibits discrimination against any person.”179
The Rojas court also found the Act unambiguous,180 holding
that “the statute prohibits discrimination against any person because of
such person’s conscientious refusal to receive, obtain, accept . . . any
particular form of health care services contrary to his or her
conscience.”181 And in Morr-Fitz, the court stated that “the statutory
language is clear,” and that Section 5 “prohibits discrimination against
anyone.”182 So the Act was not amended to clarify an ambiguity or to
mend inconsistent interpretations; it was changed because legislature’s
majority did not approve of it being used to block vaccine mandates.
Finally, the amendment is inconsistent with a reasonable
interpretation of the Act and its legislative history. Regarding the text,
the plain meaning of the term “health care service” includes COVID19 vaccines.183 With regards to the legislative history, the amendment
is inconsistent because when the law was originally enacted, COVID19 did not exist, so the enacting legislature could not have considered
how the Act would apply to COVID-19 vaccines. Thus, it is impossible
to say that the Act has never prohibited employers from imposing “any
measures or requirements . . . intended to prevent contraction or
transmission of COVID-19.”184 But when the Act was passed, other
contagious diseases like COVID-19 did exist, and vaccines were
commonly used to treat them. Still, the Conscience Act gave
179
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individuals the right to refuse any health care service–including
medications–on religious and moral grounds. Thus, the amendment is
inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statute and its
legislative history. All that to say, the latest amendment to Conscience
Act was not a clarification of existing law; it was a substantive change.

V.

CONCLUSION

Our elected official’s actions concerning the Conscience Act
have significant implications. By amending the Conscience Act, and
by calling that amendment a legislative clarification rather than
acknowledging that they changed the substance of the law, individuals
who were discriminated against because they refused a COVID-19
vaccine on moral or religious grounds are unable to assert their
statutory right of conscience, and are left without a remedy for
violations of the Act.185
By declaring that the Act was being “misinterpreted,” our
elected officials in the legislative and executive branches violated the
separation of powers. The framers believed that the separation of
powers was the key to liberty,186 and was essential to preserving
minority rights.187 The Illinois Constitution enshrines separation of
powers principles by providing that “[t]he legislative, executive and
judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers
properly belonging to another.”188 “It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”189 Our elected
officials intruded on the judicial sphere by declaring the proper
185 See, e.g., Troogstad v. City of Chicago, 576 F. Supp. 3d (N.D. Ill. 2021); Does
1-14 v. NorthShore Univ. HealthSystem, No. 21-cv-05683, 2021 WL 5578790 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
30, 2021); Darnell v. Quincy Physicians and Surgeons Clinic, No. 2021-MR-193 (Ill. 8th Cir.
Ct. Oct. 1, 2021).
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meaning of the Conscience Act, rather than deferring to the courts’
interpretations. In doing so, they undermined the settled expectations
of the citizenry, such that the people of the State of Illinois could no
longer rely on the accepted meaning of the law and arrange their affairs
accordingly. This further diminished the public’s confidence in our
elected officials. One can only wonder what liberties the next
“clarification” will dispense with.

